John Christman has argued that constitutively relational accounts of autonomy, as defended by some feminist theorists, are problematically perfectionist about the human good. I argue that autonomy is constitutively relational, but not in a way that implies perfectionism: autonomy depends on a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external, critical perspectives on one's action-guiding commitments. This type of relationality carries no substantive value commitments, yet it does answer to core feminist concerns about autonomy.

She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59).

Though widely derided by popular psychologists and self-help writers as an emotionally toxic and destructive response, blame has many defenders among contemporary moral philosophers. Blaming wrongdoers has been thought to express deep commitment to moral values and norms, to be intimately bound up with practices of holding others responsible, and to be an important exercise of moral agency. In this paper I push against the grain of such defenses of blame just enough to articulate what seems right in the more (...) popular lines of critique. I distinguish between blame as a reactive attitude and blaming as a speech act, and argue that some disagreement over the value of blame can be explained by the fact that blaming, as a speech act, takes several distinct forms. Critiques of blame, I suggest, properly target what we might call judgmental or strongly verdictive blaming, the sort of blaming that passes judgment on the wrongdoer him- or herself, and treats him or her as deserving of the blamer’s hostile or “punishing” reactions. This kind of blaming, I argue, tends to foreclose engagement in further moral dialogue with wrongdoers, an effect that is particularly destructive in therapeutic contexts. In such contexts, it is often more appropriate—and more constructive—to hold others answerable without blaming them in the strongly verdictive sense. I argue, moreover, that strongly verdictive blame may be similarly destructive outside of straightforwardly therapeutic contexts, and I challenge the idea that there is in any case a sharp or clear dividing line between therapeutic and non-therapeutic responses to wrongdoers. Holding answerable in a non-judgmental mode is a response that may have a therapeutic dimension, but it nonetheless engages a wrongdoer as a moral peer and partner in moral dialogue. This account of non-judgmental answerability, I suggest, captures much of what moral philosophers have taken to be valuable about blame, while accommodating the insights of those who criticize its more toxic forms. (shrink)

Autonomy, at least in one sense of the term, requires sovereign authority over one’s choices and actions. In this paper, I argue that such authority is relational in at least two respects. First, I argue that sovereign authority may be shared – and, indeed, must be shareable – with others through the exercise of normative powers. Second, I argue that normative powers are themselves relational powers, powers that depend in part on the recognition of agents as having an equal basic (...) authority to exercise such powers in the first place. Drawing on feminist speech-act analyses of silencing and subordination, I examine how failures of uptake for exercises of normative powers compromise personal autonomy. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a conception of joint practical deliberation as a special type of shared cooperative activity, through which co-deliberators jointly accept reasons as applying to them as a pair or group. I argue, moreover, that the aspiration to deliberative “pairhood” is distinguished by a special concern for mutuality that guides each deliberator’s readiness to accept a given consideration as a reason-for-us. It matters to each of us, as joint deliberators, that each party’s (individual) reasons for accepting something (...) as a reason-for-us support a conception of our relationship as one characterized by mutual, non-instrumental concern for one another. (shrink)

Is autonomy – governing yourself – compatible with letting yourself be governed by trust? This paper argues that autonomy is not only compatible with appropriate trust but actually requires it. Autonomy requires appropriate trust because it is undermined by inappropriate mistrust. An autonomous agent treats herself as answerable for her action-guiding commitments, where answerability requires openness to the rational influence of external, critical perspectives on those commitments. This openness to correction makes one vulnerable to manipulation and can be exploited in (...) ways that undermine autonomy instead of supporting it. We argue that autonomy is undermined by inappropriate trust, and that the inappropriateness lies in the agent’s failure to manifest appropriate responsiveness to evidence of untrustworthiness in the one trusted. The problem isn’t that autonomy requires dispensing with trust but that trust must itself be governed by appropriate responsiveness to evidence of untrustworthiness. Our view confronts two challenges. One challenge lies in explaining why you shouldn’t treat your vulnerability to manipulation as a general reason to let your trusting disposition lapse into an untrusting one. We argue that there is no such general reason to let your responsiveness to evidence of untrustworthiness be supplanted by a suspicious disposition to seek and require positive evidence of trustworthiness. A second, and deeper, challenge arises from the fact that in some especially sophisticated cases of manipulation there is no evidence of untrustworthiness to which you could respond. We argue that you cannot rationally cope with even this unresolvable risk of exploited trust by trusting only yourself. (shrink)

Right after our tragedy, my idea of forgiveness was to be free of this thing, – the anger, the pain, the absorption. It was totally personal. It was a survival tactic to leave this experience behind. It had nothing to do with the offender. The second level was realizing how the word forgiveness applies to the relationship between the victim and the offender. How it means accepting and working on that relationship after a murder. The latter is more complicated. Now (...) I think I see that forgiveness is more of integrating the experience into my life in a controlled way, rather than letting it go or escaping it. (shrink)

Hospital ethics committees (HECs) and ethicists generally describe themselves as engaged in four domains of practice: case consultation, research, education, and policy work. Despite the increasing attention to quality indicators, practice standards, and evaluation methods for the other domains, comparatively little is known or published about the policy work of HECs or ethicists. This article attempts to open the ?black box? of this health care ethics practice by providing two detailed case examples of ethics policy reviews. We also describe the (...) development and application of an evaluation strategy to assess the quality of ethics policy review work, and to enable continuous improvement of ethics policy review processes. Given the potential for policy work to impact entire patient populations and organizational systems, it is imperative that HECs and ethicists develop clearer roles, responsibilities, procedural standards, and evaluation methods to ensure the delivery of consistent, relevant, and high-quality ethics policy reviews. (shrink)

Much of the literature on practical authority concerns the authority of the state over its subjects—authority to which we are, as G. E. M. Anscombe says, subject “willy nilly”. Yet many of our “willy” (or voluntary) relationships also seem to involve the exercise of practical authority, and this species of authority is in some ways even more puzzling than authority willy nilly. In this paper I argue that voluntary authority relies on a form of voluntary obligation that is akin (in (...) some respects) to the kind of obligation one undertakes in making a promise. Voluntary authority depends, that is, on the possibility of taking on certain obligations more or less at will. It is generated through an interpersonal transaction that involves a directed act of deference, on one side, paired with appropriate uptake of that deference, on the other. Deference, in the relevant sense, should be understood as a normative power that is exercised when agents transfer deliberative discretion to others, undertaking directed obligations to treat others’ directives as content-independent and peremptory reasons. Voluntary authority, thus understood, is both grounded in and constrained by the equal moral authority or autonomy of the participants, since only autonomous agents have the standing to defer in a normatively significant way. (shrink)

The phrase “untold sorrow” evokes a sorrow that is both unnarrated (perhaps unnarratable) and of an incalculably large or unfathomable magnitude. It gestures toward experiences of loss that lie beyond the limits of ordinary comprehension. Yet there is a sense in which all loss confounds ordinary ways of relating to objects of care. In this paper I explore connections between loss, meaningfulness, and the narratability (or unnarratability) of sorrow. The point of narrating of loss is not necessarily to render the (...) loss itself meaningful, I argue, but rather to memorialize the lost object of care. Such memorialization is one way of solving the problem of how to love the dead. (shrink)

Recent feminist accounts of autonomy have focused both on autonomous agents’ relationships to others and on their self-regarding attitudes or self-relations. This chapter focuses on the attitude of practical self-care, arguing that autonomous agents must care about themselves in a sense that amounts to caring about their practical reasons. While self-care is primarily a self-relation, it also implies a form of interpersonal relationality. Caring about one’s reasons requires caring about intersubjective assessments thereof, and the relation of self-care thus implies openness (...) to the reasons of others and a disposition to hold oneself answerable for one’s identity-constituting concerns. (shrink)

Autonomy seems to require that we engage in practical deliberation and come to our own decisions regarding how we will act. Deference to authority, by contrast, seems to require that we suspend deliberation and do what the authority commands precisely because he or she commands it. How, then, could autonomy be compatible with deference to authority? In his critique of Razian instrumentalism, Stephen Darwall lays the groundwork for a distinctively contractualist answer to this question: the normative force of an authoritative (...) directive depends, he argues, on the addressee's free and rational acceptance of the reason addressed to her. But how are we to make sense of free and rational acceptance, when deference to authority requires that one relinquish deliberative discretion? I attempt to resolve this puzzle by outlining a conception of reasonable trust in authority, which, while contractualist in spirit, makes room for a core element of Raz's instrumentalist account. (shrink)

This essay identifies a connection between the capacities required for individual autonomy and the capacities required for a particular form of shared agency. Like other feminist philosophers, I hold that individual autonomy must be understood in relational terms. In the first section of the essay, I argue that that autonomy is constitutively relational in the sense that it depends upon a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external, critical perspectives. In the second section, I argue that this disposition is (...) intimately tied to a capacity for symmetrically shared or “joint” deliberation. Joint deliberation is, in my view, a centrally important form of shared agency, particularly in the context of informal, personal relationships such as friendship and love. I argue that, in virtue of its dialogical structure, joint deliberation constitutes us as autonomous in relation to one another. This is because joint deliberation depends on the presence of mutually referring attitudes that are also integral to the individual autonomy of the participants. In the final section of the paper I consider the significance of this argument from a feminist point of view, arguing that, under moderately favorable conditions, we should expect joint deliberation to destabilize acceptance of social norms that are in tension with an agent’s own self-presentation as autonomous. (shrink)

Our moral lives are replete with acts of autobiographical story-telling. The stories we tell are intended to help others understand what we do by helping them understand “who we are” in a practical or normative sense. The act of addressing one’s stories to an audience, however, is as likely to destabilize as it is to confirm one’s understanding of “who one is”. Drawing on themes in Wally Lamb’s novel I Know This Much is True, I offer a dialogical account of (...) narrative self-transformation, and articulate a conception of forgiveness understood as compassionate acceptance of ourselves (and others) as fallible self-narrators. (shrink)

In her book Victims' Stories and the Advancement of Human Rights, Diana Meyers offers a careful analysis of victims' stories as a narrative genre, and she argues that stories in this genre function as a call to care: they both depict a moral void and issue a moral demand, thereby fostering the development of a culture of human rights. This article, while finding Meyers's articulation of this idea compelling, questions Meyers's account of how victims' stories do their moral work. Whereas (...) Meyers argues that victims' stories are complete narratives, characterized by a distinctive form of closure, it suggests that the moral power of victims' stories may lie in part in their open-endedness or lack of closure. In telling their stories, victims engage their audiences in a new moral relationship and implicitly give them a role to play in bringing about the moral closure they seek. (shrink)

In this article, I consider several different ways of unpacking the metaphor of self-authorship, asking what an author might be and how authorship thus understood might be related to personal autonomy. First, I consider authors as makers or creators in a generic sense. Next, I consider authors as a particular sort of creator (the creator of a text), and, finally, authors as an interpretive construct implied by a text. Ultimately, I argue that we both construct ourselves as authors and take (...) responsibility for our self-constructs through narrative self-interpretation. Importantly, however, narrative self-interpretation is not simply a process of individual self-narration. Given the limitations placed on the autobiographical perspective by our temporal and subjective locations and the intersection of any one person's story with the stories of others, I argue that both autonomy and autobiography are best understood as relational. (shrink)

The Center for 21st Century Studies, a UW System Center of Excellence at the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee campus, is a postdoctoral research institute founded in 1968 to foster crossdisciplinary research in the humanities. This series of occasional, on-line Working Papers provides a forum for rapid distribution of ideas in texts that are not yet ready or suitable for publication in more formal academic publications, but still offer valuable content. Usually the authors of Center Working Papers will be Center (...) fellows, invited speakers, or others with significant ties to the Center, although we reserve the right to make exceptions. We regret that we are unable to consider unsolicited submissions. (shrink)

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

In this paper I examine and elaborate on Asha Bhandary’s conception of autonomy, and take up the question of what education for autonomy, thus understood, might require. I argue that educating for autonomy requires educators to impart, to students, an interlocking set of dialogical or relational skills that center responsiveness to the perspectives of others, and that these skills significantly overlap with the skills required for basic education in care.

ABSTRACT Miranda Fricker argues that paradigm-based explanations take a more direct and transparent route to the same destination as State of Nature storytelling, offering hypotheses about the basic purpose of a practice while dispensing with distracting narrative elements. I argue that narratives of forgiveness are not simply dispensable; they but offer a form of emotional and evaluative understanding to which there is no more direct route.

Los escenarios educativos son espacios propicios para pensar cómo la innovación pedagógica es una oportunidad para replantearse la enseñanza y el aprendizaje, de tal manera que respondan a la necesidad de transformar el conocimiento y la realidad presente en las aulas de clase, es decir, la diversidad de pensamientos, saberes, experiencias, intereses, culturas y trayectorias dentro de un marco inclusivo. Este trabajo tiene como finalidad presentar una propuesta de enseñanza y aprendizaje desde la elaboración de proyectos construidos en función de (...) progresiones curriculares, implementados en aulas flexibles y dinámicas, donde las interacciones, el diálogo y el trabajo colaborativo cobran un nuevo sentido y valor. Así, al eliminar las barreras contextuales, pueden emerger prácticas innovadoras que integran el conocimiento, y buscan romper con la mirada asignaturista y segregadora presente y arraigada en nuestras escuelas. A través de un enfoque cualitativo y bajo la técnica de análisis documental, se recogen y analizan experiencias de aprendizaje que responden a proyectos elaborados bajo la metodología del Aprendizaje basado en problemas y que articulan de manera progresiva el currículo. Por otro lado, se recogen las percepciones de docentes que implementaron la experiencia, poniendo en tensión la enseñanza tradicional y las innovaciones implementadas. Los resultados dan cuenta de la relevancia que cobra el trabajo colaborativo para diseñar e implementar metodologías de enseñanza para la inclusión y que tiene como motor la articulación y progresión del currículo, la propuesta muestra la factibilidad de tener aulas activas, donde la experiencia y el aprendizaje mediado son posibles como consecuencia de una sinergia continua. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that identification-free self-reference is immune to error through mis-identification because even though self-reference and self-identification are distinct, they are not separable. This provides a critique and a reductio of Carol Rovane’s neo-Lockean analysis of ‘I’ in terms of a definite description, since no definite description or proper name can be substituted salva sensu or salva veritate for the singular term ‘I’. Furthermore, I distinguish between self-identification and self-ascription, and argue that even if there may be (...) an error in self-ascription, the self-identification component – that is, the reference and identity of ‘I’ – remains unshaken. There is no way of losing track of the subject in ‘I’-thoughts, since there is no way of forming dynamic Fregean thoughts. I conclude by arguing that one’s capacity to think of oneself self-consciously is not exhausted by the presence or absence of linguistic devices such as ‘I’. Rather, it has to do with the metaphysics concerning the nature of the self. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that identification-free self-reference is immune to error through mis-identification because even though self-reference and self-identification are distinct, they are not separable. This provides a critique and a reductio of Carol Rovane’s neo-Lockean analysis of ‘I’ in terms of a definite description, since no definite description or proper name can be substituted salva sensu or salva veritate for the singular term ‘I’. Furthermore, I distinguish between self-identification and self-ascription, and argue that even if there may be (...) an error in self-ascription, the self-identification component – that is, the reference and identity of ‘I’ – remains unshaken. There is no way of losing track of the subject in ‘I’-thoughts, since there is no way of forming dynamic Fregean thoughts. I conclude by arguing that one’s capacity to think of oneself self-consciously is not exhausted by the presence or absence of linguistic devices such as ‘I’. Rather, it has to do with the metaphysics concerning the nature of the self. (shrink)

The feminist debate about an ethic of care that began during the early 1980s has become so extensive that it is difficult to provide an overview of it. Since its beginnings, the debate has generated a series of independent models for an ethic of care, as well as a vast number of articles suggesting ways to expand critically, or to provide alternative readings of, traditional conceptions of morality. Carol Gilligan sparked the entire discussion with her book In a Different (...) Voice, in which she outlines her theory of the different moral developments of women and men. According to Gilligan, the “male” conception of morality may be understood as an ethic of justice, while the “female” conception can be seen primarily as an ethic of care. This thesis ignited an often very fiercely argued discussion of its empirical correctness and the validity of its generalization. (shrink)

Carol Gould's article offers a powerful argument against the sufficiency of informed consent in an age of surveillance capitalism. In this review, I assess the three main claims that Gould makes in her article, namely that (1) democratic control is required by the all‐affected principle; (2) democratic control is a means of ensuring that surveillance corporations and governments track public, rather than merely private, interests; and (3) democratic control is constitutive of freedom as self‐development and self‐transformation.

Applying the tools and methods of analytic philosophy, analytic feminism is an approach adopted in discussions of sexism, classism and racism. The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism presents the first comprehensive reference resource to the nature, history and significance of this growing tradition and the forms of social discrimination widely covered in feminist writings. Through individual sections on metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory, a team of esteemed philosophers examine the relationship between analytic feminism and the main areas of philosophical reflection. (...) Their engaging and original contributions explore how analytic feminists define their concepts and use logic to support their claims. Each section provides concise overviews of the main debates in feminist literature within that particular area of research, as well as introductions to each of the chapters. Together with a glossary and an annotated bibliography, this companion features an overview of the basic tools used in reading analytic philosophy. The result is an in-depth and authoritative guide to understanding analytic feminist's characteristic methods. Table of contents List of Contributors Acknowledgments Editor's Preface Part 1: Introduction 1. Introduction: What Is Analytic Feminism? Pieranna Garavaso, (University of Minnesota Morris, USA) 2. Introduction: Why Analytic Feminism? Ann Garry, (California State University, Los Angeles, USA) 3. Introduction: The Society for Analytical Feminism: Our Founding Twenty-Five Years Ago, Ann E. Cudd (College of Arts and Sciences at Boston University, USA)and Kathryn J. Norlock (Trent University, USA) Part 2: Metaphysics 4. Introduction to Feminist Metaphysics, Katharine Jenkins (The University of Nottingham, UK) and Pieranna Garavaso (University of Minnesota Morris, USA) 5. Feminist Metaphysics: Can This Marriage be Saved? Jennifer McKitrick, (University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA) 6. Feminist Metaphysics as Non-Ideal Metaphysics, Mari Mikkola (Humboldt University, Germany) 7. Kinds of Social Construction, Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Barcelona, Spain) 8. Gender and the Unthinkable, Natalie Stoljar (McGill University, Canada) 9. Who's Afraid of Andrea Dworkin? Feminism and the Analytic Philosophy of Sex Katharine Jenkins, (The University of Nottingham, UK) Part 3: Epistemology 10. Introduction to Feminist Epistemology, Pieranna Garavaso (University of Minnesota Morris, USA) 11. Contemporary Standpoint Theory: Tensions, Integrations, and Extensions, Sharon Crasnow (Norco College, USA) 12. Objectivity in Science: The Impact of Feminist Accounts, Evelyn Brister (Rochester Institute of Technology, USA) 13. Feminist Philosophies of Science: The Social and Contextual Nature of Science, Lynn Hankinson Nelson (University of Washington, USA) 14. Reasonableness as an Epistemic Virtue, Deborah K. Heikes (University of Alabama, USA) 15. Agnotology, Feminism, and Philosophy: Potentially the Closest of Allies, Janet A. Kourany (University of Notre Dame, USA) 16. Say Her Name: Maladjusted Epistemic Salience in the Fight Against Anti-Black Police Brutality, Ayanna De'Vante Spencer (Michigan State University, USA) 17. The Epistemology of (Compulsory) Heterosexuality, Rachel Fraser (University of Cambridge, UK) Part 4: Value Theory 18. Introduction to Value Theory, Amanda Roth (State University of New York at Geneseo, USA) and Pieranna Garavaso (University of Minnesota Morris, USA) 19. Relational Autonomy and Practical Authority, Andrea C. Westlund, (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA) 20. (Feminist) Abortion Ethics and Fetal Moral Status, Amanda Roth (State University of New York at Geneseo, USA) 21. Feminist Approaches to Advance Directives, Hilde Lindemann (Michigan State University, USA) 22. What is Sex Stereotyping and What Could Be Wrong with It? Adam Omar Hosein (University of Colorado, Boulder, USA) 23. Kant's Moral Theory and Feminist Ethics-Women, Embodiment, Care Relations, and Systemic Injustice, Helga Varden (University of Illinois, USA) 24. Resisting Oppression Revisited, Carol Hay (University of Massachusetts Lowell, USA) 25. Women and Global Injustice: Institutionalism, Capabilities, or Care? Angie Pepper (University of York, UK) 26. Feminism, Nationalism, and Transnationalism: Reconceptualizing the Contested Relationship, Ranjoo Seodu Herr (Bentley University, USA) Part 5 Basic Logical Notions Pieranna Garavaso (University of Minnesota Morris, USA) and Lory Lemke (University of Minnesota Morris, USA) A–Z of Key Terms and Concepts Pieranna Garavaso (University of Minnesota Morris, USA) . (shrink)

New Tenth Anniversary edition of this classic text with a new preface by the author, compares myths about meat-eating with myths about manliness, and seeks to ...

A student's future as a knowledge worker (one who "thinks for a living" with the task of problem solving) is the starting point of this book. With this in mind, the book combines a review of philosophical positions and problems with practical examples and perspectives gained from everyday challenges faced by knowledge workers in their businesses and organizations. Through the use of summative chapters, highlighted key concepts, questions for reflection, and illustrative examples on how to work with the theories presented, (...) the book provides a clear and accessible introduction to this challenging subject. Philosophy of Science primarily addresses students studying language, communication, marketing, economics, and management. However, the survey of the theoretical schools of thought - as well as the discussions on research ethics and the role of research in society - will be equally relevant for other students in the humanities and the natural and social sciences. (shrink)

The existential analysis -- The death of dasein -- The timeliness of dasein -- The derivation of time -- The time of being.

In this book, Carol Gould offers a fundamental reconsideration of the theory of democracy, arguing that democratic decision-making should apply not only to politics but also to economic and social life. Professor Gould redefines traditional concepts of freedom and social equality, and proposes a principle of Equal Positive Freedom in which individual freedom and social co-operation are seen to be compatible. Reformulating basic conceptions of property, authority, economic justice and human rights, the author suggests a number of ways in (...) which these principles could be realised in social institutions. She also discusses such issues as democratic control of technology, the nature of democratic personality, and the question of democracy in international relations. (shrink)

In this book, Carol Gould offers a fundamental reconsideration of the theory of democracy, arguing that democratic decision-making should apply not only to politics but also to economic and social life. Professor Gould redefines traditional concepts of freedom and social equality, and proposes a principle of Equal Positive Freedom in which individual freedom and social co-operation are seen to be compatible. Reformulating basic conceptions of property, authority, economic justice and human rights, the author suggests a number of ways in (...) which these principles could be realised in social institutions. She also discusses such issues as democratic control of technology, the nature of democratic personality, and the question of democracy in international relations. (shrink)

The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...) the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. (shrink)